In Section 5, we solve for a range of ex post equilibria of the CCA in proxy strategies. We then consider the resulting allocation and revenue for some particular cases of interest. Here we …ll in some omitted calculations.
The equilibrium bid parameters are
The equilibrium outcome x solves v 1 (x) = v 2 (1 x), which means
Here we omit the 1 subscript to slightly simplify notation.
To solve for revenue, suppose the parameters are such that s 1 (1) ; s 2 (1) 0. Then the CCA revenue, given a …nal allocation (x ; 1 x ) is
Substituting for A 1 ; A 2 , B, and x we get:
which leads to the expression
It follows that
where the last inequality follows because b > ja 1 a 2 j by assumption, and 1.
Now, if = 0 so that both bidders are consistent, the equilibrium outcome of the CCA is exactly the same as a truthful Vickrey auction. If > 0, the revenue is lower. So the equilibrium CCA revenue is less than the truthful Vickrey revenue.
Asymmetric Equilibria.
Suppose now 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. In equilibrium, bidder 1 is truthful in the clock phase:
but does not fully raise his …nal bids, so that
Bidder 2 expands demand to
in the clock phase, where 2 = 1 b 1 , and then is consistent in the …nal round, so that:
We can write the …nal bid functions as:
Bidder 2's equilibrium quantity is ine¢ ciently large. Setting v 1 (x) = v 2 (1 x) and solving for the equilibrium quantity x that goes to bidder 1, we obtain:
:
The revenue comparisons are more subtle. We have:
We know that when 1 = 0, the CCA outcome corresponds to the truthful Vickrey outcome.
We therefore consider how revenue changes when there is a small increase in 1 that takes the CCA outcome away from the Vickrey outcome.
Di¤erentiating with respect to 1 , we obtain
and evaluating at 1 = 0:
The second term disappears because when 1 = 0, then x is de…ned as the solution to:
So simplifying, we have
This expression can be either positive or negative, depending on the parameters that determine x .
The intuition is the following. As 1 increases, bidder 1 gives bidder 2 a discount, while bidder 2 (by expanding demand) makes bidder 1 pay more. The allocation also changes but that has a second-order e¤ect on revenue. The net e¤ect is that revenue increases if x 1 is su¢ ciently high, and otherwise decreases.
